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INTRODUCTION
The Low-rate Denial of Service (LDoS) [1] attack is a new type of DoS attack, which produces the similar harmful effect as the DoS attack. The LDoS attacks use the vulnerability of TCP congestion control mechanism and periodically send high intensity pulse attack flows to reduce network services capabilities. Because of the much lower average attack traffic of the LDoS attacks it is difficult to distinguish from the normal traffic. Then the LDoS attacks are more covert and can't be detected by existing DoS detection methods.
Currently, some progress has been made in the field of the LDoS detection methods [2, 3] , such as the min-TRO method [1] , the wavelet analysis method [4] , the DTW method [5] , the HAWK method [6] , the Vanguard method [7] , and the EWMA method [8] . These methods are still some deficiencies as the low accuracy, the high false-negative rate, the high false-positives rate, the weak reliability and so on. For example, the EWMA method [8] which is proposed by Chen is based on the EWMA algorithm. This detection method can detect most kinds of the LDoS attack. While the EWMA algorithm may smooth not only the normal traffic but also the abnormal traffic. This will affect the detection accuracy for the LDoS attacks.
In this paper, we analyze the abnormal traffic and abnormal distribution of ACK traffic caused by the LDoS attacks, then we provide a new LDoS detection method based on coefficient of variation and AEWMA algorithm. NS2 simulations show that this detection method for the LDoS attacks has a high accuracy rate, a low falsenegative rate and a low false-positive rate. Based on LBNL Datasets and MAWI Datasets, the experiment results show that the efficiency of this detection method has improved compared with EWMA method.
II. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

A. The Model Description of LDoS Attack
The congestion control mechanism, which is a very important adaptive mechanism of the internet network, has an obvious defect. When the congestion control mechanism is be set to work, the send window and the buffer queue will be rapidly shrink, then the service capability of the network has been a sharply decline. The LDoS attacks exploit this flaw and periodically send high intensity pulse attack flows, then the network repeating congest and cannot provide normal services.
In order to reduce the service capability of the network, the LDoS attacks usually send high intensity pulse data flows. Then the power of the LDoS attacks can be defined as (1) .
where function A(t) denotes the intensity of pulse attack of this LDoS attack, S(t) denotes the intensity of silent period, C denotes the bottleneck bandwidth, T denotes the cycle of attack, τ denotes the duration time of attack, and this LDoS attack last from t Orig to t End . Moreover in order to get the attack effect, function A(t) and S(t) must meet A(t)>C and S(t)<C.
In order to get the much better attack efficiency with minimum cost, function s(t) is usually set to s(t)=0. Then, the power of the LDoS attacks is usually shown as (2) .
Then the three important parameters (T attack , t attack , R attack ) of the LDoS attacks can be defined as (3) .
where T attack denotes the cycle of attack, t attack denotes the duration time of attack and R attack denotes the average intensity of attack pulse. Then the average traffic of the LDoS attacks E denotes as 
B. The Abnormal ACK Traffic
In order to get the better attack effect the LDoS attacks usually occur in a "busy" network. In this environment, the LDoS attacks can make a significant impact on network traffic and conceal themselves. According to the focus of this paper, we propose three kinds of representative scenes of the network as follows [8] : (1) Scene 1: the normal network without any attacks; (2) Scene 2: exist other attacks which have made a significant impact on network traffic but except the LDoS attacks, such as the DDoS attacks (3) Scene 3: exist the LDoS attacks. At the same time, each scene has a sufficient number of TCP connections and background data traffic. According to the LDoS attacks principles, the "effective" TCP traffic and the corresponding ACK traffic will change significantly when the LDoS attacks have occurred. As the actual network TCP connection uses the "Piggybacking" and the "Cumulative Acknowledgment" scheme, for increasing the detection efficiency, we analyze the ACK traffic to detect the LDoS attacks.
In three scenes, the i (  is small but 3  sharply rises. Therefore, the average and the variance of the ACK traffic in three scenes meet 1
   . In order to distinguish these three scenes, the Coefficient of Variation (CV) is introduced as follows.  . Therefore, the LDoS attacks can be preliminarily detect by measuring the coefficient of variation. The advantage lies that this method can filter the normal traffic very rapidly for its low cost and the false-negative rate is low. But the false-positive rate may be high because there are some misjudgments in certain cases. In order to reduce the false-positive rate, the other abnormal characteristics caused by the LDoS attacks should be made a further study.
C. The Abnormal Distribution Of ACK Traffic
A large number of experiments have proved that, according to the central limit theorem the Gaussian distribution can describe most of the real network data traffic distribution [9] . So we use the Gaussian distribution to express the ACK traffic Probability Distribution Function (PDF) of the three different scenes, such as 1
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 is the symmetry axis. In order to compare the distribution of the three scenes, we normalize the functions 1  , 2  and 3  , make the symmetry axis of the three functions accordant, and set i xx    , which have been shown in figure 2. Fig. 2 shows that there are some differences of the distribution of the functions 1  , 2  and 3  after normalized. The differences manifest that there is such an interval, which the probability of which 1  and 2  are outside of this interval is much lower (<1%), but the probability of which 3  is outside of this interval is much higher (>>1%). The probability of outside this interval has the greater "deviation" between function 3 According to the analysis above, in the Scene 3, because the LDoS attacks have convulsed the ACK traffic, there would have the two abnormal characteristics as follows: the sharp rise of the coefficient of variation and a significant deviation of the distribution. To the testing data, we can firstly observe the coefficient of variation. If there was the sharp rise of the coefficient of variation, the LDoS attacks may exist and we would continue to measure the distribution of ACK traffic to confirm the LDoS attacks. Otherwise, if there was not the sharp rise of the coefficient of variation the traffic must be normal and without the LDoS attacks.
III. DETECTION METHOD
A. Measure the Abnormal Traffic
In order to analyze the abnormal ACK traffic samples, the concept of the Testing Window is defined as follows. The TW and the CVP of ACK traffic are shown in figure 3 . Fig. 3 Then if JC1 is meeting in TW i , the LDoS attacks may exist in this TW, thus the other characteristics of distribution need to measure and analyze. While the accidental error would have a negative effect when the distribution of ACK traffic is measured and analyzed. In order to eliminate this negative effect, the AEWMA (Adaptive Exponentially Weighted Moving Average algorithm) algorithm is employed to smooth the accidental error.
B. The AEWMA Algorithm
The AEWMA algorithm is a kind of improved EWMA algorithm. The fundamental principle of the EWMA algorithm is that the more recent of the sample values, the more information and the more weight. Its statistical value is a weighted linear combination of the sample values. The improvement lies that, the AEWMA algorithm which is compared with the EWMA algorithm, uses the weighted nonlinear combination for the sample values. By using a nonlinear weight function the AEWMA algorithm can retain the exception mutation and smooth the accidental error of the sample. So the AEWMA algorithm is adaptable. The arithmetic [10] is shown in (5).
 is a nonlinear weight function called the Score function, which can keep the larger mutation and eliminate the small noise of objects. () e  is a piecewise function so that it can preserve the larger e and smooth the smaller e . The smooth factor λ decide the smoothing ability of AEWMA, and the factor k is the threshold value of the piecewise function. λ and k determine the distribution of the AEWMA statistical values for the ACK traffic.
C. Measure the Abnormal Distribution
By using the AEWMA algorithm the accidental error can be smoothed and the exceptional mutation can be retained, then the abnormal distribution of ACK traffic caused by the LDoS attacks can be exactly measured. When the LDoS attacks exist, the distribution of the ACK traffic will deviate, we use the specified CI to measure the dispersion degree and the oscillation frequency. So the LDoS attacks can be detected by analyzing and contrasting the dispersion degree and the oscillation frequency of ACK traffic's distribution.
In a TW, the S i of the ACK traffic is named Obviously, each AC contains at least an AP. The concept of AP and NP denotes the relative position between the AEWMA statistical point and CI, and then the number of AP denotes the dispersion degree of ACK traffic's distribution. Moreover, each AC can denote one oscillation beyond the CI, and then the number of AC can denote the oscillation frequency of ACK traffic's distribution. In order to analyze and contrast the dispersion degree and the oscillation frequency of ACK traffic's distribution in the TW, definition 5 is introduced as follows.
Definition 5: In a TW, the ratio of the number of AP to the number of all AEWMA statistical points is called RAP. The frequency of AC to the number of all AEWMA statistical points in this TW is called FAC.
RAP can denote the dispersion degree of ACK traffic's distribution, and FAC can denote the oscillation frequency of ACK traffic's distribution. Thus the ACK traffic's distribution can be exactly measured.
In the Scene 1, the ACK traffic is stable and S ACK is normal distribution, namely few S ACK s are outside CI. So NP is more and AP is less. Therefore RAP and FAC are both small. In the Scene 2, DDoS attacks cause the network continued congestion, and the traffic is almost zero the same as the S ACK . So RAP and FAC approach to zero. In the Scene 3, LDoS attacks cause the ACK traffic more volatile and the S ACK anomalistic, the dispersion degree and the oscillation frequency increase quickly, so AP is more and RAP is larger, at the same time AC and FAC are larger too.
According to the characteristics of distribution of AEWMA statistics of ACK traffic on CI for the three scenes, the judgment criterion is proposed as follows.
Judgment criterion 2 (JC2): In a TW, if AP RAP  and AC FAC  , then the LDoS attacks may exist. Where AP  and AC  are the specified constants which can be calculated from training data.
According to the analysis above, if in a TW, JC1 and JC2 are both meeting, the LDoS attacks can be confirmed.
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IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experiment 1
In order to detect the feasibility and accuracy of the AEWMA algorithm, we build the experiment system shows that this detection method is accurate for the Scene 1 and the Scene 2 and has not produced the false-negative, although the experiment group 10 appears false-positive.
The false-negative and false-positive generate at the time when the LDoS attacks have been just beginning or finished. In the TW 11 of experiment group 10 after the LDoS attacks have been just finished, the t attack is large and the network self-healing process is slow, then the false-positive appears. Experiment results show that false-positive rate is only 2%, so this proposed method has a high accuracy rate.
B. Experiment 2
The experiment 2 evaluates the misjudgment without any attacks. 21 datasets randomly from LBNL (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) Datasets [11] 
Number of TW False Positives
This Method EWMA Method This Method：11/217; EWMA Method：16/217 Figure 7 . The detection results of MAWI Datasets By using this proposed method, 20 misjudged TWs for LBNL Datasets and 11 misjudged TWs for MAWI Datasets are produced. So, the false-positive rate of LBNL Datasets is 2.6% and the false-positive rate of MAWI Datasets is 5.1%. By using the EMWA algorithm, 31 misjudged TWs for LBNL Datasets and 16 misjudged TWs for MAWI Datasets are produced. So, the falsepositive rate of LBNL Datasets is 4.1% and the falsepositive rate of MAWI Datasets is 7.4%. The detection results of this proposed method and EWMA method are shown in Table II . In this experiment for LBNL Datasets and MAWI Datasets, the results show that the falsepositive rate of this proposed method is lower than that of the EWMA method. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
According to the abnormal characteristics of the ACK traffic caused by LDoS attacks, firstly, the abnormal traffic and abnormal distribution of ACK traffic are summarized. Secondly, the concept of coefficient of variation is used to measure the abnormal traffic, and then the concept of abnormal point and abnormal chain are used simultaneously to measure the abnormal distribution from the dispersion degree and the oscillation frequency. Thirdly, the judgment criteria are developed. Therefore, a new LDoS attacks detection method based on coefficient of variation and AEWMA algorithm is proposed. Two sets of Experiments have proved that this LDoS attacks detection method is effective. In the future work, we will extend the judgment criteria to improve the detection accuracy in the further study of the test parameters.
